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Law

Eastman v Biomet: Read Your Release / Settlement Language

July 11, 2018 by Levinson and Stefani Leave a Comment

Two hands are tearing up a signed paper. Cancellation of contract, document or agreement. Business concept

In Eastman v. Biomet Inc., a man who had already accepted $25,000 to settle a products-liability suit against Biomet filed a second suit in hopes of receiving an additional $175,000. Eastman v. Biomet, Inc., No. 17-3463, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 14106 (7th Cir. May 29, 2018). Biomet had been in a multi-district litigation where the plaintiffs alleged that they had suffered injuries due to Biomet’s artificial hip devices. The parties entered into a Master Settlement Agreement which outlined the procedures for determining the settlement amounts that would be received by the individual plaintiffs. The agreement provided that certain categories of plaintiffs would presumptively receive $200,000 with Biomet being able to offer a reduced amount in appropriate cases. The agreement also provided mediation of disputes about the settlement awards as an option.

Eastman was offered $25,000 to settle his case with Biomet. “Biomet’s attorney gave four reasons for the reduction: (1) Eastman had no medical records from the four-and-a-half years after he received the artificial hip device, (2) he never had been definitively diagnosed with injuries caused by the device, (3) he had suffered physical injuries in a brawl the day before he had surgery to replace the device, and (4) his medical records described him as “a horrible patient”.” It was also mentioned that mediation could be arranged if Eastman so desired, but Eastman chose not to mediate. Eastman accepted Biomet’s offer and signed a broad release of his claims, which essentially stated that in return for the $25,000 payment, he released Biomet from “all claims … of whatever kind … whether known or unknown … [that are] in any manner connected with” Biomet’s hip-replacement device.

Despite signing the release, Eastman sued Biomet for breach of the Master Settlement Agreement a few months later. His reasoning was that Biomet had breached the Agreement by reducing his settlement award from $200,000 to $25,000 without “good cause”. Biomet moved for summary judgment stating that the release Eastman had signed to settle the first suit barred him from the second suit, at which time Eastman responded that the release he had signed was not a binding contract but a counteroffer since he had made changes to the document. Unbeknownst to either Biomet or Eastman’s own attorney, Eastman had changed “irrevocable” to “revocable” in a provision that read: “By signing this Release, the RELEASING PARTY understands that it is irrevocable.” Second, he changed “binding” to “nonbinding” in a provision that read that the “Release shall be final and binding upon RELEASING PARTY.” Finally, he changed the choice-of-law provision so that it stated the release was to be governed by Arkansas law rather than Indiana law.

The district court rejected that argument and granted Biomet’s motion for summary judgment. Eastman appealed, challenging the district court’s conclusion that the release barred him from his second lawsuit. The court said that the Master Settlement Agreement had given both parties the opportunity to dispute the base settlement amount through mediation and that Eastman had waived this right when he accepted and retained Biomet’s $25,000 payment as settlement. Eastman could not use the agreement as “a basis for a contract claim for $200,000 while simultaneously ignoring the provision conditioning that sum on a process that he has eschewed.” The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment.

Chicago Porch Fall Verdict Stands: Walstad v. Klink

June 4, 2018 by Levinson and Stefani Leave a Comment

Verdict word cloud concept on grey background

Case Summary: Walstad v. Klink

$2.5M verdict in porch case stands; case timely filed

In the case of Walstad v. Klink, a woman fell off the rear porch of an apartment building, resulting in her being paralyzed from the waist down. She had fallen through the yellow tape that the defendant had put up to act as a handrail.

On May 21, 2018, the state appeals court upheld the $2.5 million jury verdict awarded to the plaintiff rejecting the defendant’s argument that the lawsuit against the estate of her now-deceased husband had been untimely filed.

The plaintiff had originally filed a personal injury and premises liability complaint against the original defendant, the owner of the apartment building, and against the City of Chicago. In 2006, the original defendant’s wife, Klink, was added as a defendant by amendment. The City of Chicago filed a motion for summary judgment that was eventually granted by the trial court, dismissing the city as a defendant. While the dismissal was on interlocutory appeal causing the case to be stayed, both the original plaintiff and original defendant passed away. The plaintiff’s mother took over the lawsuit for her daughter but did not add the defendant’s estate as a party until 2013.

The defendant argued that the plaintiff had taken too long to name the estate as a party in her third amended complaint, violating 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(1), (2), and (5). The 1st District Appellate Court found that the Plaintiff’s third amended complaint had been timely filed because the defendant had known that a claim would have been brought against her husband’s estate and had notice of the claim. The court reasoned that the defendant’s argument went against 735 ILCS 5/2-616(d), which allows parties to add defendants in a lawsuit even when it would normally be time-barred if certain conditions were met. The court decided that in this case, these conditions had been satisfied.

The case had gone to trial in 2016 after being stayed for years due to the interlocutory appeal. During that time, along with the passing of both the original plaintiff and original defendant, the defendant’s wife filed for bankruptcy in 2015 before the jury issued a verdict in December 2016. Because of Klink’s declaration of bankruptcy, no insurance on the building, and the estate of the original defendant having no assets, the attorneys for both parties said that the plaintiff’s estate would collect nothing from the defendant’s and there ended up being no verdict to collect.

Coming 2016: New laws for Illinois drivers

December 22, 2015 by Ken Levinson Leave a Comment

Illinois House of Representatives (Photo: Daniel Schwen)
Illinois residents will soon feel the impact of several new laws taking effect in 2016, including those pertaining to road and public safety. In preparation for the New Year we’ve put together a “Greatest Hits” list for you to peruse before the holidays.

On the road again (with restrictions)

One of Illinois’ new laws deals with a topic we’ve covered here on the blog before, stirring a bit of controversy amongst our fellow attorneys. Starting January 1, repeat DUI offenders will soon have an opportunity to obtain a restricted driving permit after meeting certain conditions determined by the state. Under the new law, a person with as many as four DUI convictions will be eligible to apply for a permit after demonstrating their sobriety and practical needs for a vehicle. Multiple DUI convictions have damaging effects on people’s driving records, which, unfortunately, has forced many drivers with revoked licenses to get behind the wheel of a car illegally. This new law aims to curb that trend. Additionally, a law from Senator Jason Barickman’s office would also require individuals convicted of two or more DUIs or reckless homicide convictions to install a Breath Alcohol Ignition Interlock Device as a condition of a Restricted Driving Permit.

Slowing it down

Senator Pat McGuire introduced a bill that will require drivers to slow down when approaching waste service vehicles like recycling trucks, an issue that intends to improve the safety conditions of workers on the job. The new law “Provides for the circumstances in which the 15 mile per hour speed limitation on passing waste service vehicles shall apply,” also known as the “slow down” law. Offenders could be forced to pay upwards of $1,000 in fines, or even face jail time.

Immunity for minors (sort of)

After a few years in limbo, the governor has signed a previously introduced bill that grants amnesty to minors who call 911 for help, as in cases of alcohol poisoning, for example. Based on the language of the bill, police would have the authority to determine whether protection from legal discipline is appropriate. The plan is modeled after a similar one addressing heroin overdoses, with at least two-dozen other states that have implemented similar laws in recent years.

Below are some other new laws that relate to life on the road:

Public Act 099-0290: The License Plate Visibility Exemption: allows for trucks with rear-attached forklifts to be exempt from the requirement that their license plate be clearly visible.

Public Act 099-0237: Reduced Weight Limit on Roads: Highway commissioners may permanently post roads at a reduced weight limit after holding a public forum regarding reasons for and against imposing the limit. County superintendents of highways then have the final deciding power in the matter after the public forum.

Public Act 099-0376: School Bus Industry Requirements: Provides that a private carrier employer of school bus drivers shall be held to a standard of ordinary care for intentional acts committed in the course of employment by a bus driver permit holder.

Public Act 099-0291: Trucking Violations: Provides that any driver who willfully violates specified motor carrier safety regulations including driving under the influence; motor carrier drivers’ hours of service; motor carrier qualifications for drivers; or other violations which would place the driver or vehicle out of service is guilty of a Class 3 felony when the violation results in a motor vehicle accident that causes great bodily harm, permanent disability or disfigurement, or death to another person.

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